The validity of information contained in financial statements is an important concern for users of these statements. Validity can only be achieved through independent attestation of financial statements by auditors. Hence, auditor independence has been a concern of regulators for a long time. Specifically, the provision of non-audit services by auditors is assumed to create economic dependence of auditors on clients and therefore impairs auditor independence. This paper examines whether the provision of non-audit services by triennially inspected audit firms impairs audit quality, measured as the propensity to issue a going concern opinion (GCO) for the time period 2004 -2006. In addition, it is examined whether the association between non-audit service fees and the propensity to issue a GCO is stronger for triennially inspected audit firms that receive a deficient inspection report from the PCAOB than for triennially inspected audit firms that receive a clean inspection report from the PCAOB. This study does not find support for either of these hypotheses. The relationship between non-audit service fees and the likelihood of issuing a GCO is insignificant for the sample of triennially inspected firms. In addition, the going concern decision by triennially inspected auditors is not influenced by the outcome of their inspection report and the association between NAS and GCO is not stronger for firms with a deficient inspection report compared to those with a clean inspection report.
to uncover a breach and independence is necessary for auditors to report this violation in an audit report (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004) . Therefore, the propensity to issue a GCO as a measure of audit quality seems appropriate because this reflects both parts of the audit quality definition and is relevant in assessing the relation of independence to audit quality. This is supported by DeFond, et al. (2002) who argue that the GCO represents a direct and unambiguous assessment of auditor independence. Geiger and Rama (2003) also note that independence concerns are especially relevant in situations that require auditors' judgments, such as going concern decisions. It is expected that the provision of NAS, a measure of independence, is negatively related to audit quality, because the probability of uncovering and reporting a violation (DeAngelo, 1981 ) is expected to be lower, the higher the level of NAS which impair auditor independence. Prior research on the impact of provision of NAS on audit quality measured as the propensity to issue a GCO in the U.S. has generally not found the expected negative association, as is examined below. DeFond et al. (2002) investigate a sample of 2,428 financially distressed firms in the fiscal year 2000. They do not find an association between NAS and auditor's propensity to issue a GCO and no relation between total fees or audit fees and an auditor's propensity to issue a GCO. Hence, there is no indication that NAS impair auditor independence. The authors conclude that incentives created through an economic dependency are less important than market-based incentives, such as fear of litigation or loss of reputation.
Geiger and Rama (2003) utilize a matched-pair design sample of 66 financially distressed companies with and without a GCO, each for the fiscal year 2000. This design is chosen because it allows a better selection of the control sample. Geiger and Rama (2003) also do not find a significant relationship between NAS and NAS to audit fee ratio and the likelihood of receiving a GCO. Contrary to DeFond et al. (2002) , Geiger and Rama (2003) find a significant positive association between audit fees and the likelihood of receiving a GCO which is attributed to a higher audit effort put forth by auditors when higher audit fees are paid. Callaghan, Parkash and Singhal (2009) examine a sample of 92 bankrupt U.S. companies for the period 2001 to 2005. In this study bankrupt firms instead of financially distressed companies were analyzed because these firms should have received a GCO due to unambiguous signs of financial distress. Comparable to DeFond et al. (2002) , using a sample of bankrupt U.S. firms does not yield a significant association between the likelihood of issuing a GCO and NAS, NAS to audit fee ratio, audit and total fees. Robinson (2008) investigates the association of tax services provision and GCOs for a sample of 209 U.S firms filing for bankruptcy in the years 2001 to 2004. Robinson (2008) finds a significant positive association between GCOs and the magnitude of tax NAS, but does find a positive relationship between NAS to audit fee and NAS to total fee ratio and the likelihood to issue GCOs. This means that the provision of NAS in fact increases the likelihood to issue a GCO for Li's sample (2009), contrary to the conventional assumption that there is a negative relationship between these variables. This result might be attributable to auditor conservatism in the immediate post-SOX period.
For this reason, Geiger and Blay (2012) investigate a sample of financially distressed firms for the period 2004 to 2006, where financial distress is defined in a more stringent way than in previous studies. They find a significant negative relation between NAS fees of the current and subsequent years and the likelihood to issue a GCO. Hence, Geiger and Blay (2012) confirm the expectation that a higher magnitude of NAS fees received by auditors decreases the propensity to issue a going concern decision by these auditors.
To summarize, prior research has generally not found a significant negative association between audit quality, measured as the propensity to issue a GCO and provision of NAS within the U.S. regulatory framework for studies that include pre-SOX data (DeFond et al., 2002; Geiger & Rama, 2003; Callaghan et al., 2009) . The only studies that find a significant relation between these variables find a positive relation for specific NAS (Robinson, 2008) or immediately following SOX (Li, 2009) . The use of more recent post-SOX data, however, confirms a significant negative relationship between level of NAS fees and the likelihood to issue a GCO (Geiger & Blay, 2012) . Overall, these findings provide mixed evidence about the relationship between the provision of NAS and audit quality. This study attempts to shed more clarity on the association between NAS and the propensity to issue a GCO in the post- 
Impact of Auditor Characteristics on Going Concern Reporting
The models used in prior research on the relation between NAS and GCOs usually acknowledge auditor size as a predictor variable, but no other auditor characteristics are considered. The studies above all include the size measure Big N, because prior research had asserted that large auditors are more likely to issue GCOs than smaller auditors. This is, DeAngelo (1981) and Mutchler et al. (1997) argue that large audit firms have more quasirents to lose compared to small audit firms if audit quality or independence is impaired and this information becomes public. Therefore, larger firms are more likely to issue a GCO than small firms in fear of losing more quasi-rents through litigation. The studies referred to above all find that Big N companies have a positive association with the propensity to issue a GCO, meaning that Big N audit firms have a higher likelihood of issuing a GCO than their smaller counterparts. It can thus be inferred that large auditors are of higher quality in terms of reporting decisions.
Hence, it might be interesting to examine a sample of small audit firms. Small audit firms are of lower quality in terms of a going concern reporting decision. For this reason, a relationship between NAS and the propensity to issue a GCO might be more pronounced for a sample of small firms which could confirm the predicted negative relationship between the two variables.
Research Question and Hypotheses
Based on the literature review above, this section develops the research question and hypotheses. Prior research on the impact of provision of NAS on audit quality in the U.S.
has found mixed evidence regarding the association of NAS fees and impaired audit quality, measured as the propensity to issue a GCO. Auditor size was considered as a factor in modeling a going concern decision in prior models which concluded that large auditors are more likely to issue a GCO and hence have higher audit quality. A negative relationship between NAS and propensity to issue a GCO is more likely to be found for a sample of small auditors.
A way of discriminating small and large auditors is by the cycle of audit inspections by the PCAOB which inspects audit firms with more than 100 public clients annually and issuers with less than 100 issuers triennially since 2004 (PCAOB, 2013 . Triennially inspected firms audit around 80% of companies with less than $100 million in revenue, and are therefore essential for the audit market (Olson, 2008) . Following the discussion on auditor size and going concern reporting quality, it is expected that these triennially inspected
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firms have lower audit quality than annually inspected firms. Therefore, a negative association between NAS and propensity to issue a GCO is expected for a sample of triennially inspected firms, because the probability of uncovering and reporting a going concern issue is expected to be lower the higher the level of NAS.
H1:
There is a negative association between the provision of non-audit services and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion for companies audited by triennially inspected audit firms.
The objectives of the PCAOB's inspection reports are to examine an audit firm's quality control policies and to evaluate how a firm executes selected audits. Key questions that are answered when evaluating selected audits are whether the firm followed the PCAOB's auditing standards, whether adequate effort was put forth, and whether there is an indication that the audit firm was not independent under SEC and PCAOB rules (PCAOB, 2012) . Quality control policy inspections include the review of management structure and processes, including commitment to independence and review of the audit firm's processes for monitoring audit performance, including independence policies (PCAOB, 2012) . The inspection results are summarized in an inspection report with a public and non-public part.
The public portion, available on the PCAOB's website, states significant audit deficiencies, if present. The non-public portion describes quality control weaknesses (PCAOB, 2012) . The publicly available report of the inspection clearly states whether the PCAOB's inspection found one or more deficiencies for the different assessment categories. For this reason, the inspection report can be classified as either clean, for audit firms without any deficiency or deficient, for audit firms with one or more deficiency (PCAOB, 2012).
Hence, the outcomes of inspection reports (deficient or clean) give an indication of auditor quality and effort. Auditor effort might have a large impact on going concern decisions which requires a lot of judgment from auditors and low effort of auditors which is reflected in a deficient report might lead to a lower likelihood of issuing a GCO (Geiger and Rama, 2003) , and deficiencies can point to problems in independence of audit firms (PCAOB, 2012) . Given that 60% of triennially inspected firms show a deficient result for the first inspection round (Hermanson et al., 2007) Gramling et al. (2011) find that low quality auditors that receive a deficient report generally perform worse in terms of going concern reporting prior to the inspection report. For this reason, the period until the firsttime inspection reports become available is especially interesting, as afterwards audit firms that received a deficient report perform better, on average.
H2:
The association between non-audit service fees and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion is stronger for triennially inspected audit firms that receive a deficient report in the first inspection than for triennially inspected audit firms that receive a clean report in the first inspection.
Methodology
This section describes the sample selection procedure and the final sample, followed by a description of the logistic regression model that is used to model the probability of triennially inspected audit firms to issue a GCO to financially distressed clients.
Sample Selection
Going concern and fee data are retrieved from the Audit Analytics database for the fiscal 
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All companies that received a GCO are included and companies that did not receive a GCO are only considered if they are financially distressed, where financial distress is defined as either negative net operating cash flow or negative net income (Reynolds & Francis, 2000; DeFond et al., 2002; Li, 2009 ). This selection is made because a going concern decision is only important for financially distressed firms. The number of observations is decreased by 143 companies that neither received a GCO nor are in financial distress to 159 observations in total.
Finally, information from the PCAOB inspection reports for triennially inspected firms that are publicly available on the PCAOB's website (PCAOB , 2013) 
Going Concern Model
Following DeFond et al (2002) , the going concern model to test the hypotheses is estimated by the following logistic regression model:
The 
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The dependent variable GCO is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that receive a going concern opinion and 0 otherwise. The independent variables of interest are FEERATIO, ln(NAS FEE), ln(AUDIT FEE) and ln(TOTAL FEE), as well as DEFICIENCY. An association between the propensity to issue a GCO and NAS can be represented by the variable FEERATIO, the ratio of NAS fees to total fees, or variable ln(NAS FEE). The variables ln(AUDIT FEE) and ln(TOTAL FEE) are included because an economic dependence which influences the propensity to issue a GCO can be created not only through NAS fees, but also through the magnitude of audit fees and hence total fees. contributing to the possibility of a violation of debt covenants which is associated with a higher likelihood to receive a GCO (AICPA, 1988) . LLOSS is included because firms with prior year losses are more likely to receive a GCO because a recurring negative trend increases doubtfulness about the continuance of an entity as a going concern (AICPA, 1988) . The cash flow measure OP CASH FLOW is included because low operating cash flows indicate a higher probability of failure and therefore a negative association is expected between OP CASH FLOW and GCO. Moreover, an audit of a financially stressed company takes more time than an audit of a financially healthy company and report lags were found to be positively related to the likelihood of receiving a GCO (McKeown et al., 1991) . Hence, 
5 Results and Discussion
This section presents the analysis and results of the tests of the hypotheses. Firstly, descriptive statistics for the full sample and the subsamples of firms with and without a GCO are shown. Secondly, the multivariate analysis and discussion of the results of the going concern model are presented. 
Descriptive statistics
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Overall, this sample of small firms represents financially distressed firms and replicates previous studies in terms of many variables proving the relevance of the data. A difference in variables naturally exists in terms of size, as well as fee data paid to auditors due to the sample selection. (Sharpe, De Veaux & Velleman, 2012; Li, 2009) . Overall, there is little indication that multicollinearity problems arise for the going concern model and the sample at hand.
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To summarize, the descriptive statistics show that the sample at hand is representative for small financially distressed firms and that the control sample is acceptable. In addition, there is some evidence for the fact that the provision of NAS reduces the likelihood of issuing a GCO, as the ratio of non-audit service fees to total fees is higher for the group of firms that did not receive a GCO, but this result does not control for other effects. Table 2 reports the result of the first five models that test hypothesis 1 which investigates whether there is a negative association between the provision of NAS and the propensity to issue a GCO for companies audited by triennially inspected audit firms. 
Multivariate Analysis
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Model 2 adds variable FEERATIO to the baseline model which increases the fit of the model slightly (Pseudo R-square=59%). The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees is insignificant (p-value=.38) and therefore provides no indication that NAS fees influence the likelihood of issuing a GCO. The same control variables as in model 1 stay significant.
Model 3 introduces variable ln(TOTAL FEE) to the baseline model 1. Overall, this causes a large increase in the pseudo R-square (66%). Total fees are highly significantly positive in predicting the likelihood of a GCO. This means that the higher the total fees received by the auditor the higher the odds that a client receives a GCO (odds=7.35). This result contradicts the notion that economic dependence from high total fees impairs auditor independence, which is supported by model 4.
Model 4 which introduces a combination of FEERATIO and ln(TOTAL FEE) to the first model also does not find a statistically significant coefficient for the ratio of NAS fees to total fees (p-value=.16) and provides a similar result as model 2. Interestingly, the coefficient for the total fees an auditor receives is again highly significant (p-value=.00). This means that $1 more in total fees paid increases the odds of receiving a going concern for client firms by 8.27. This again calls into question the notion that high fees impair auditor independence.
Finally, model 5 introduces ln(AUDIT FEE) and ln(NAS FEE) to the baseline model, to test whether the absolute level of NAS fees influences the likelihood of a GCO, when The variable ln(NAS FEE) is highly insignificant with a p-value of 0.95 which does not provide evidence that non-audit fees influence the going concern decision, similar to model 2 and 4. The variable ln(AUDIT FEE), however, is highly significant (p-value=.01) and has a positive coefficient. This means that high audit fees increase the likelihood of a GCO, which is contrary to the expectation that high fees create economic dependence and therefore impair auditor independence. Overall, this does not lend any support to hypothesis 1. Neither of the variables ln(NAS FEE) and FEERATIO which account for NAS fees are significant in predicting the likelihood of a GCO. An additional analysis which adds the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees to the baseline model also does not find a significant relationship. Table 2 : Going concern logistic regression models including fee data for a sample of 25 going concern (GCO=1) and 130 non-going concern (GCO=0) financially distressed firms audited by triennially inspected audit firms ( Similar to Geiger and Rama (2003) , this study finds a significantly positive association between audit fees and the likelihood of a GCO, and total fees and the likelihood of a GCO.
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In addition, receiving a deficient report does not predict the likelihood of a GCO in any of the models 1 to 5. These results call into question the viability of hypothesis 2 which tests whether the association between non-audit service fees and the propensity to issue a GCO is stronger for triennially inspected audit firms that receive a deficient report in the first inspection, than for triennially inspected audit firms that receive a clean report in the first inspection. Table 3 reports the result of models 6 and 7 to test hypothesis 2. These two models add an interaction term between variable DEFICIENCY and ln(NAS FEE) and FEERATIO respectively, to model the interaction effect that is hypothesized in H2. Overall, the model fit is only slightly higher than for the baseline model with a pseudo R-square of 59% for model 6 and 7.
164 Table 3 :
Going concern logistic regression models including interaction terms for a sample of 25 going concern (GCO=1) and 130 non-going concern (GCO=0) financially distressed firms audited by triennially 
DEFICIENCYxln(NAS FEE)).
Other combinations of these variables, for example leaving out variable DEFICIENCY and ln(NAS FEE) or FEERATIO also does not provide a significant result for any of the variables of interest. Hence, as the interaction terms are insignificant a relationship between non-audit services of deficient companies and the likelihood of issuing a GCO cannot be found. Overall, there is no indication that the association between non-audit service fees and the propensity to issue a GCO is stronger for triennially inspected audit firms that receive a deficient report in the first inspection than for triennially inspected audit firms that receive a clean report in the first inspection. Consequently, hypothesis 2 cannot be supported based on the data at hand.
To check the robustness of these results a subsample with a stricter definition of financial distress is used for the regression analyses, following the procedure in Geiger and
Blay (2012) . Financial distress in this study was defined as either negative net operating cash flow or net income. This strict selection of financial distress decreases the sample size by 30 to 125 observations, with 22 observations with a GCO and 103 observations without a GCO. This analysis does not provide a different result from above, and hypotheses 1 and 2 are also not supported for a subsample of firms with negative net operating cash flow and net income.
Discussion and Implications
This section discusses the results of this study and provides interpretations for the findings. As no significant negative impact of NAS on audit quality was found for triennially inspected firms, these auditors are likely to have other incentives to remain independent.
For triennially inspected auditors, market-based incentives, such as maintaining a high reputation, threat form litigation and fear of loss of clients might be factors that facilitate independence (DeAngelo, 1981) . However, it has been shown that litigation threats and client losses are less important for small auditors than large auditors, because a client loss results in relatively small losses of quasi-rents for small auditors and small auditors have little to lose in case of a class-action lawsuit (Lennox, 1999) . Therefore reputation incentives might be the driving force for small auditors to remain independent even though they provide NAS. In general small auditors have lower reputation than large auditors (Lennox, 1999) and thus it might be even more important to maintain reputation capital for small auditors.
Secondly, the going concern decision by triennially inspected auditors is not influenced by the outcome of their inspection report. This confirms the conclusion by Gunny and Zhang (2013) who also do not find a relationship between going concern reporting performance and outcome of inspection reports. Hypothesis 2 can hence not be supported and the association between NAS and GCOs is not stronger for firms with a deficient inspection report compared to those with a clean inspection report.
Lastly, this study does find a positive relationship between total fees and audit fees received by the auditor and the likelihood of issuing a GCO. The significance of total fees is likely due to the audit fee portion of total fees. Hence, the higher the audit fees received by the auditor the higher the likelihood of issuing a GCO. This means that audit fees do not create an economic dependence between auditors and clients, but rather increase audit quality. This result is similar to Geiger and Rama (2003) who also find that audit fees are positively related to the propensity to issue a GCO for a small sample of 66 non-going concern and 66 going concern companies in the pre-SOX era. The similarities of these results might be due to the lack of statistical power because of the small samples in both studies.
Geiger and Rama (2003) attribute their result to the fact that high audit fees lead to higher audit effort and in turn a higher likelihood of issuing a GCO. Other authors have also found similar relationships between audit fees, effort and quality (e.g. Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1986; Davis, Ricchiute & Trompeter, 1993) .
Overall, auditor independence and quality does not seem to be impaired by NAS fees for triennially inspected firms in the post-SOX period, contrary to the expectations by regulators. The reason for this is that financially distressed firms that receive a GCO might simply not have funds available to spend on NAS. In addition, the going concern decision by triennially inspected auditors is not influenced by the outcome of their inspection report and the association between NAS and GCOs is not stronger for firms with a deficient inspection report, compared to those with a clean inspection report. The study does, however, find a significantly positive relationship between the magnitude of audit fees and total fees and the likelihood of a GCO.
Overall, this study finds no indication that fees paid to auditors are a cause for an economic dependence between triennially inspected auditors and their clients and thus do not impair audit quality. On the contrary, audit fees and total fees paid to triennially inspected auditors increase an auditor's likelihood for a financially distressed firm to receive a GCO, and therefore their independence. This last finding can most likely be attributed to the fact that higher audit fees increase the level of auditor effort during an audit, which results in improved decisions about a GCO. These findings question regulators' concerns about triennially inspected auditors providing audit services in combination with NAS to their clients, as this is argued to impair independence (SEC, 2000) . However, this study investigates the impact of independence in fact on audit quality and not perceived independence, which is the SEC's main concern.
Finally, this study faces limitations with regard to sample selection, methodology as well as lack of statistical power. The sample at hand is small with only 155 observations in total and has asymmetric group sizes for the going concern and non-going concern subsamples. The rule of thumb for sample sizes of logistic regression analyses is ten events per variable (Vittinghoff, & McCulloch, 2007 and audit quality of triennially inspected audit firms should utilize a larger sample in future, i.e. including more than one round of inspection reports (Geiger & Blay, 2012) .
Secondly, it was not controlled for unexpectedly low or high fees which are argued to create dependence of auditors on clients instead of actual fees received (DeFond et al., 2002; Callaghan et al, 2009; Li, 2009; Geiger & Blay, 2012) . Even though DeFond et al. Thirdly, causality between provision of audit and non-audit fees and the likelihood to issue GCOs cannot be established. This is because during the audit of a financially distressed company a decision about a GCO has to be made. This decision requires high professional judgment and large effort from auditors (AICPA, 1988) and therefore it is likely that higher audit fees are charged. Hence, the higher the financial distress, the higher the expected fees because higher audit effort is required. Financially distressed firms might also be less likely to spend high NAS fees than their counterparts, because these services might not be affordable. Therefore no relationship might be found between NAS fees and the likelihood of issuing a GCO. Some studies argue that these endogeneity issues might arise for the going concern model (DeFond et al, 2002; Li, 2009; Geiger & Blay, 2012) because fee data as well as GCOs are related to financial distress. This is not controlled for in this study and therefore no causality can be established for the significant association between audit fees and the propensity to issue a GCO.
Due to the three limitations presented above, the unrepresentative sample, failure to control for unexpected fees and failure to control for endogeneity, the results of this study have to be interpreted with great caution and conclusions that are drawn might not be reliable.
